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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

THE APPLICATION OF STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS TO PUBLIC EMPLOYEES
AND OFFICERS
By

W

ORKMEN'S

EDWIN 0.

STENE*

compensation is a product of statutory law, and

therefore an analysis of the statutes would present a fairly
complete picture of the protection afforded in the various states.
There are, however, many terms the meaning of which have been
clarified, and sometimes, it seems, changed by the courts in applying the law. For this reason it is necessary, as it is with most
laws, to examine into the court reports as well as the statutes. It
is particularly important to do so in order to determine the application of the laws to public servants, because many of the old
rules of governmental liability have been carried over by the
courts as guides to the construction of the acts.
At the present time all the states except four southern ones
have workmen's compensation laws. But in the states of New
Hampshire and Texas, and in the Territory of Alaska, the compensation acts fail to mention public employments. 1 The question
therefore arises as to the extent to which these laws apply to
public entities without expressly including them as employers.
The New Hampshire law applies only to hazardous employments in a few enumerated industries. It is therefore evident
that local governments would not be included unless they were
engaged in one or more of these enumerated industries. 2 Nevertheless, many cities and towns have voluntarily accepted the law
and are paying their employees under its provisions.'
The Texas compensation law provides that the term "employer," as used therein, shall mean "any person, firm, partnership,
association of persons, or corporations (sic.), or their legal representatives, that make contracts for hire."4 Because of the legal
* Instructor in Political Science, University of Cincinnati.

'New Hampshire has, by separate enactment, authorized the governor
and council to pay compensation benefits to injured state employees. Laws
1929, ch. 140. A table classifying the states according to their provisions
public employments is included at the end of this article.
covering
2
Industries which might be engaged in are street railway operation and
construction and operation of electric lines, N. H. Public Laws 1926, ch. 178.
3 Letter of November 10, 1930 from J. S. B. Daire, Labor Commissioner
4 of New Hampshire.
Texas Revised Civil Statutes, 1925, title 130, art. 8309, sec. 1.
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rule that the state and its purely governmental agencies, such as
counties and school districts, are not subject to statutory law unless the legislature expressly makes them so, it is evident that
they are not included within the Texas definition of "employers." '
But what about municipal corporations? May they not be included within the meaning of the term "corporations ?" The commission of appeals has held that they are not, that the term means
"private corporations," and that municipalities are not included
either as to their public or as to their proprietary functions.0 This
conclusion does not seem to be in accord with the rulings in
earlier cases that employers' liability statutes changed the liabilities of municipal corporations in so far as those corporations were
liable in tort under the common law.- If the courts insist on
carrying over the common law doctrines to construe other provisions of the workmen's compensation laws, why should they not
do so in this case? One explanation seems to be that all arguments relative to the principle of workmen's compensation are
set forth with businesses operated for profit in mind. It is quite
probable, however, that many courts would be more liberal in applying such provisions than the Texas commission of appeals has
been."
In Georgia the compensation law was drawn up to apply to
all subdivisions of the state, but it has been declared unconstitutional in so far as it applies to counties. The constitution enumerates the purposes for which the legislature may authorize counties
to levy taxes, and the courts have held that the enumeration cannot be implied to include any authorization to expend tax monies
for the payment of workmen's compensation claims or insurance.'
5

Counties are mere agents of the sovereign state, and "Laws are made

for the subject, not for the sovereign." Forsythe v. Pendleton County,
(1924) 205 Ky. 770, 266 S. W. 639. See also Gray v. Board of Commis-

sioners
of Sedgwick County, (1917) 101 Kan. 196, 165 Pac. 867.
6
City of Tyler v. Texas Employers' Insurance Association, (Tex.
Comm. of App. 1926), 288 S. W. 409; Adkinson v. City of Port Arthur.
(Tex. Civ. App. 1927) 293 S. W. 191. In the Tyler case the commission
of appeals overruled a decision of the court of appeals (Texas Employers'
Ins. Ass'n v. City of Tyler, (Tex. Civ. App. 1926) 283 S. W. 929. which

held that the statute included municipal corporations in so far as they were

engaged
in proprietary functions.
7
Eugene McQuillin, A Treatise on the Law of Municipal Corporations,
sec. 2620, p. 5391; Josupeet v. City of Niagara Falls, (1910) 70 Misc. Rep.
638, 127 N. Y. S. 527; City Council of Sheffield v. Harris, (1893) 101 Ala.
564, 14 So. 357.
sCity of Tyler v. Texas Employers' Insurance Association, (Tex. Civ.
App. 1926) 283 S.W. 929. Application of the law to private functions is
suggested in Forsythe v. Pendleton County, (1924) 205 Ky. 770, 266 S.W.

639. 9

Floyd County. v. Scoggins, (1927)

164 Ga. 485, 139 S.E. 11.
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"BUsINESS"

AND "PROFIT"

Although the Kansas compensation law specifically includeb
"county and municipal work" as one of the hazardous emplovments covered, the courts have so construed the terms as to makc
them practically superfluous. In part the reason for thc construction is to be found in the vagueness of the terms; in part it
arose out of the fact that the legislature tried to include certain
public employments by casual mention in an act otherwise framed
with reference to private employments only.
In defining "workmen" the act of 1911, as amended in 1913,
provided that the term "does not include any person employed
otherwise than for the purpose of the employer's trade and business," and in another place the act was said to apply to the employer's "trade and business." In applying the statute to municipal
corporations, the court argued that "trade and business" implied
a business for gain or profit. From this they concluded that the
theory of the law is-as it is when applied to private industrythat the cost of compensation can be added to the price of the
product. But, the courts argued, most functions of counties and
municipalities are not operated for gain or profit. Therefore the
compensation law does not apply.1" The anomalous conclusion
was that, while an employer's liability act or possibly a workmen's
compensation law in which the terms did not so clearly suggest
profit-making, would apply to all proprietary functions, sometimes including such functions as street and sewer construction,
the Kansas compensation law was made to apply only to those
functions from which municipalities might expect to make profits."
Since counties are merely agents of the state and do not carry on
any business for profit, the term "county work" has been construed to mean only such work as is done for counties by private
contractors. Consequently, if a county. instead of having its
'°Griswold v. City of Wichita. (1917) 99 Kan. 502, 162 Pac. 276.
"1"A city in constructing a lateral sewer, while exercising a proprietary
power, is not engaged in an enterprise involving an element of gain or profit,
and therefore is not within the operation of the workmen's compensation
act." Roberts v. City of Ottawa, (1917) 101 Kan. 228, 165 Pac. 869; also
quoted with approval in Redfern v. Eby, (1918) 102 Kan. 484, 170 Pac. 800.
In the Ottawa case the court tried to make its decision consistent with
the rule of liberal construction by stating that "the statute must be liberally
construed, but the courts cannot go beyond the Legislature and add what
was omitted, or change the character and manifest object, purpose, and
limitations of the enactment." In the same case the opinion was expressed
that if the legislature had intended to include cities, "it is remarkable that
no apt or clear language indicating such intention was used."
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work done by contract, hires its own employees and furnishes its
own machinery to do the work, an employee injured in the course
of his duty has no legal claim against it for compensation.':
When the Kansas legislature enacted the new workmen's compensation law in 1927, it retained the words "county and municipal
work," but eliminated or changed some of the provisions which
referred to "business, trade or gain."" Although there have been
no decisions of the supreme court applying the law to governmental functions, a decision handed down in 1929-in which a
city water department was held to be included within the meaning of the act, because it was "operated for trade and gain"indicates that the earlier decisions will continue to be followed.*'
Nevertheless, some counties and municipalities have accepted the
act without limitations as to employments covered, and the coinmissioner of workmen's compensation has announced that complete acceptances will be received by him and "the holding of the
commissioner will be that such municipalities are within and subject to the provisions of the compensation act and jurisdiction will
be taken of accidental injuries in such cases.'"
12 Gray v. Board of Commissioners of Sedgwick County, (1917) 101
Kan. 195, 165 Pac. 867. Counties are "mere instrumentalities of the state
government," and there is an "unvarying rule to relieve (them) from all
liability not expressly imposed by the state."
But where a county had insured its employees under the mistaken
assumption that it would be held liable for compensation, the insurance company would not escape payment of compensation on the ground that the
county was not liable. Robertson v. Labette County, (1927) 122 Kan. 486,
261 Pac. 934; Board of Commissioners of Labette County v.Federal Ins.
Co., 13(1927) 124 Kan. 712, 261 Pac. 839.
Sec. 6 (new sec. 5), which defined the "Application of the Act," was
amended by eliminating the words "which is conducted for the purpose of
business, trade or gain." In section 8, defining "workmen" the new law
eliminated the words "but does not include a person who is employed otherwise than for the purpose of the employer's trade or business." But section
5 still provides that the act shall apply "only to employment in the course of
employer's trade or business in .. . county and municipal work."

McCormick v. Kansas City, (1929) 127 Kan. 255, 273 Pac. 471.
1 Commissioner of Workmen's Compensation (Topeka, Kan.), Bulletin No. 7, "Application of the Workmen's Compensation Act, Chapter 232,
Laws of Kansas 1927, to County and Municipal Work," December 28, 1929.
The City of Arkansas City elected to come within the act on February
4. 1928 and did not in any way limit the scope of its election. The election
stated that "it engaged in the business of municipal government." Copy of
letter written by Harry G. Bauman, member of the Labor Commi;ioun. to
the Hess Realty Company, Arkansas City, Kansas, on September 20, 19-9.
On November 17, 1930, fifty-eight cities had elected to come within the
provisions of the act, but some limited their election to specified functions,
such as "street department,....
transmission lines," or "water and light department." A few counties and townships had also accepted the provisions
of the act. Letter from Harry G. Bauman, dated November 17, 1930.
14In
5
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In two or three other states the courts have applied a similar
construction to acts which used the terms "business," or "gain or
profit" with the result that the intentions of the legislatures were
practically annulled. Except in Louisiana"6 the decisions are not
of great importance at the present time, however, since the Nebraska statute was later amended to eliminate any doubt as to its
application, while the New York decisions have not been followed
in later cases. 7
A more liberal attitude has been taken by the Supreme Court
of Oklahoma in construing the terms "business" and "gain." The
compensation law of that state, as passed in 1915, defined "employment" as work carried on in a business for "pecuniary gain."
In 1919 the legislature amended the act to include the state and its
political subdivisions as employers and to include "construction of
public roads" as a hazardous employment; but the definition of
"employment" was left unchanged. The court decided, however,
that a casual reading of the entire act indicates that the legislature
intended to change the old rules of municipal liability and to protect public as well as private employees. Therefore, it was concluded, the provision relating to "pecuniary gain" was either repealed by implication, or it "originally found its way by inadvertence into this otherwise harmonious system of laws."' s The
16A recent Louisiana decision, although it is somewhat vague as to the
extent of its application, maintains the rule that at least some of the public
agencies, including school districts, are not subject to the compensation law
hecause they are not engaged in any "trade, business, or occupation."
Charity Hospital v. Bd. of School Directors, (La. 1932) 140 So. 60.
"7Before it was amended the Nebraska law specifically included the
state and its governmental subdivisions as employers, but provided in
another place that the term "employee" "should not be construed to include
any person whose employment is casual, or not for the purpose of gain or
profit by the employer." This, the court ruled, operated to exclude all
enterprises of the state or its subdivisions except those which were conducted for "pecuniary gain or profit." Ray v. School District of Lincoln,
(1920) 105 Neb. 456, 181 N. W. 140; Rooney v. City of Omaha, (1920) 105
Neb. 447, 181 N. W. 143; Mecomber v. City of North Platte, (1920) 105
Neb. 464, 181 N. W. 145.
The constitution of New York provides that moneys paid as compensation "shall be held to be a proper charge in the cost of the business of the
employer." Because of that provision the appellate division held, in the case
of Krug v. New York City, (1921) 196 App. Div. 226, 186 N. Y. S.727,
that "where there is no business upon which the compensation can become a
charge ...there is no warrant for the legislation." In later cases, however, the New York courts held that when a public employee is engaged in
a function which is listed as hazardous, he is entitled to compensation
whether or not he is performing a governmental function. Hughes v. City
of Buffalo,
(1924) 208 App. Div. 692, 203 N. Y. S.391.
' 8 Board of Commissioners v. Whitlow, (1923) 88 Oki. 72, 211 Pac.
1021.
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supreme court of West Virginia has also ruled that the terms
"industry" and "business" as used in the compensation law do not
refer to public employers, and that the act should be construed
liberally so as to include employees engaged in any sort of work,
governmental or industrial.19 Other courts have held that "business" does not necessarily imply trading or profit, and that a
county or city may be in the "business of local government." APPLICATION OF LAWS TO OFFICERS

In construing terms which involve the application of workmen's compensation laws to public employments, there is perhaps
no question which the courts have had to answer more frequently
than that of the meaning of the terms "employee" and "employment." The meaning of "employer" is not as frequently questioned because most states expressly provide that the state, counties, municipal corporations, and other subdivisions of the state
shall be included as "employers." But no such simple definition
is-applied by the statutes to the term "employee." Sometimes the
term is left undefined, but more frequently the statutes give a
general definition such as "any person in the service of another
under any contract of hire or apprenticeship, written or implied."
Employment is frequently defined as "service under any appointment or contract of hire or apprenticeship," or in other similar
terms.
Unless there are provisions in the statute which might be implied to limit its application to certain functions, such as was the
case with Nebraska, 2 ' the courts have held that the express in;clusion of the state and its governmental subdivisions, or any of
them, as employers has the effect of including both proprietary
and governmental functions as "employments." ' " Any other construction would be almost impossible as long as purely governmental agencies of the state are included with municipal corporations.
But the courts are not as ready to conclude that the law covers
I 90 Esque v. City of Huntington, (1927)

104 W. Va. 110. 139 S. W. 469.

2 A special policeman was "in the business of the police force." Lake
v. City of Bridgeport, (1925)

102 Conn. 337, 128 At. 782.

The "business" of a county "includes the performance of the duties

prescribed by law." Los Angeles County v. Industrial Commission, (1928)
89 Cal. App. 738, 265 Pac. 362.
2See
note 17.
2
2 Hughes v. City of Buffalo, (1924)

208 App. Div. 682, 203 N. Y. S.

391; Esque v. City of Huntington, (1927) 104 W. Va. 110, 139 S.E. 469.
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all persons in the service of the public entity. The principal
reason for strict construction of provisions relating to the application of the laws to the public service has its roots in the old
distinctions between "officer" and "employee." When the legislature has used the term "employee"-and that is the term used
in practically all workmen's compensation laws-the courts hold,
almost without exception, that the intention was to exclude officers
unless they were expressly included in the statutory definition of
"employee. 2-3 This conclusion leads us to the question of definition of "officer," and the distinction between officer and employee.
There are numerous cases in which the courts have defined the
term "officer," but there is perhaps no definition so clear as to
remove all doubt as to its meaning when it is applied to particular
positions or persons. Judges have held that every office "implies
an authority to exercise some portion of the sovereign power of
the state, either in making, executing, or administering the laws,"2 "
that an officer renders a "public service; a service in which the
general public is interested ;112 and that an officer may be distinguished from an employee by the greater "importance, dignity and
independence" of his position.2 6 But more concrete guides to the
distinction may be found in the method by which the position is
created and the incumbent selected, the source from which his
powers are received and his duties imposed, and the condition
under which he enters upon his duties. If a position has been
created by statute, charter, or ordinance, and if the powers and
duties are prescribed by such enactments, the courts will consider
the position an office.27 Furthermore, a commission of appoint23

City of Macon v. Wittington, (1931) 42 Ga. App. 622, 157 S. E. 127.
Mann v. City of Lynchburg, (1921) 129 Va. 453, 106 S. E. 371; Kahli v.
City of New York, (1921) 198 App. Div. 30, 189 N. Y. S. 547: Youngman
v. Town
of Oneonta, (1923) 204 App. Div. 96, 198 N. Y. S. 217.
2
4Olmstead v. Mayor, etc., of New York, (1877) 42 N. Y. Super. Ct.
481. See also Pennel v. City of Portland, (1924) 124 Me. 14, 125 Atl. 143:
State Conservation Dept. v. Nattkemper, (1927) 86 Ind. App. 85, 158 N.
E. 168.
2
5Smith v. Dooling, (1911) 145 Ky. 240, 140 S. W. 197.
26
Pennel v. City of Portland, (1924) 124 Me. 14, 125 Atd. 143.
Public office "clearly embraces the idea of tenure, duration, fees or
emoluments, rights and powers, as well as duties; a public station or employment; an employment confirmed by appointment."
Kahl v. New
York,
(1921) 198 App. Div. 30, 189 N. Y. S. 547.
27
Pennel v. City of Portland, (1924) 124 Me. 14, 125 Ati. 143; Burrel
v. City of Bridgeport, (1921) 96 Conn. 555, 114 At. 679; City of Chicago
v. Industrial Commission, (1919) 291 III. 23, 125 N. E. 705; Blynn v. City
o! Pontiac, (1915) 185 Mich. 35, 151 N. W. 681; Johnson v. Industrial Commission, (1927) 326 Ill. 553, 158 N. E. 141.
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ment and the requirement of an oath are frequently indications
of the existence of an office. -s A person who is elected is considered an officer,2 and one who has been appointed by the chief
executive of the state or of a municipality is more likely to be
regarded as an officer than is one who has been appointed by some
inferior officer3 ° Finally, the power to exercise discretion is a
sign of the existence of an office, since it involves independence
and authority."
But the a6tual operation of the legal distinction between officers and employees when applied to workmen's compensation
laws can be illustrated more clearly by showing how some of the
common positions have been classified. Peace officers-sheriffs,
constables, marshals, general or special police-are, in almost all
cases, held to be public officers, and are therefore not covered by
compensation laws which apply only to employees." - But, in a
few cases, where policemen have not been provided for by charter
or ordinance, or where they have been treated as employees by the
cities, the courts have held them to be employees within the law . 3
A fireman is in most cases held to have a status similar to that of
-8 Olmstead v. -Mayor, (1877) 42 N. Y. Super. Ct. 481; Pennel v. City
of Portland, (1924) 124 Me. 14, 125 Ati. 143; Blynn v. City of Pontiac,
(1915) 185 Mich. 35, 151 N. W. 681.
-9Town of Wonewoo v. Industrial Commission, (1922) 178 Wis. 656,
190 N. W. 469.
30 McDonald v. City of New Haven, (1920) 94 Conn. 403, 109 Ati. 176;
Burrell v. City of Bridgeport, (1921) 96 Conn. 555, 114 Atl. 679.
3'McCendon v. Board of Health, (1919) 141 Ark. 114, 216 S. W. 298;
Pennel v. City of Portland, (1924) 124 Me. 14, 125 Atl. 143.
32Shelmandine v. City of Elkhart, (1921) 75 Ind. App. 493. 129 N. W.
878; Blynn v. City of Pontiac, (1915) 185 Mich. 35, 151 N. W. 681 ; Hall
et al. v. City of Shreveport, (1925) 157 La. 589, 102 So. 650.
A policeman remains a public officer even though he is detailed to work
of an elemental nature, such as caring for a police station. Ryan v. City
of New York, (1920) 228 N. Y. 16, 126 N. E. 350.
A state game warden is an officer. State Conservation Dept. v. Nattkemper, (1927) 28 Ind. App. 85, 156 N. E. 168.
33McCarl v. Borough of Houston, (1919) 263 Pa. 1, 106 At. 104.
A policeman merely appointed by resolution or by approval of the
recommendation of a department head, without any provision for policemen in either the charter or ordinance, is an employee. La Belle v. Village of Grosse Pointe Shores, (1918) 201 Mich. 371, 167 N. V. 923; Johnson v. Industrial Commission, (1927) 326 Ill. 553, 168 N. E. 141.
The test of whether a policeman is an officer or an employee depends
upon (1) the charter provisions, and (2) how he was recognized by the
city. Where the city had regarded a policeman as an employee and had
paid him workmen's compensation as such. it cannot later contend that he
was an officer. Millely v. City of Grand Rapids, (1925) 231 Mich. 70, 203
N. W. 651.
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a policeman. 34 The status of road or bridge supervisors, hospital
superintendents, or persons in other similar positions depends
primarily upon the provisions of the law and the nature of their
appointments.3"
An exception to the general rule of excluding officers from
the application of the compensation laws unless they are specifically mentioned is found in the attitude taken by the supreme
court of North Dakota. The law of that state, after defining
"hazardous employments" so as to include practically all employments except farm labor and domestic service, defines "employee"
as "every person engaged in a hazardous employment, tinder any
appointment, or contract of hire, or apprenticeship, express or
implied, oral or written." 36 A policeman was killed in the performance of his duty, and the court held that his dependents were
entitled to compensation, on the ground that an officer was an
"employee" of the city, within the meaning of the law. In explaining its conclusion, the court argued that "in the portion of
the law devoted to the definition of terms . . . there is an evident

tendency toward generalization in definition rather than restriction." This was indicated by the use of such terms as "every
person" and "any employment." The courts should, therefore,
construe the provisions liberally. Furthermore, the words "tinder any appointment" indicated that officers were to be included. t
Whether or not the legislatures intended in such cases to include officers under a definition of the term "employee" is diffi34

McDonald v. City of New Haven, (1920) 94 Conn. 103, 109 Atli. 176.
But if a city insures its firemen under the mistaken conception that
they are employees, the insurance company is not thereby excused from
fulfilling its part of the agreement. Frankfort General Ins. Co. v. Conduitt, (1920) 74 Ind. App. 584, 127 N. E. 212. The same rule has been
applied in Georgia. City of Macon v. Whittington, (1931) 171 Ga. 643, 156
S. E. 674, 157 S. E. 127. But in that state the courts hold that even though
the compensation insurance policy covers municipal officers, the municipality
and the insurance company are not estopped from denying the existence of
the relationship of employer to employee. City of Macon v. Whittington,
(1931) 171 Ga. 643. 156 S. E. 674. 157 S.E. 127; also Parker v. Travelers'
Ins. 35
Co., (Ga. 1932) 163 S.E. 159, 161.
A road supervisor was held to be an officer in Youngman v. Town
of Oneonta, (1923) 204 App. Div. 96, 198 N. Y. S. 217.
But the superintendent of a city hospital appointed by the board of
overseers of the poor and "subject to its jurisdiction and control," was held
to be an employee. Pennel v. City of Portland, (1924) 124 Me. 14, 145
Al. 143. Similarly a "superintendent of city bridges," under the direction
of the director of public works, was held to be an employee. Burrell v.
City 36of Bridgeport, (1921) 96 Conn. 555, 114 Atl. 679.
North Dakota, Acts 1919. ch. 162, sec. 2. This is a common definition 3T
of the term "employment."
Fahler v. City of Minot, (1923) 49 N. Dak. 960, 194 N. W. 695.
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cult to determine. In fact, the intent may vary from state to
state. The advocates of exclusion might point to the fact that a
large number of states exclude officers specifically. On the other
hand, it may be pointed out that in some states a decision construing the law to exclude officers is almost immediately followed
by an amendment to the statute by which such persons are expressly included. 38
In the states where all officers are specifically excluded from
the application of the compensation laws the results are the samine
as where the courts have held them to be excluded by the mere
use of the term "employee.

'

39

But in several states certain classes

of officials, usually those who are elected, are specifically excluded
from the application of the law. 40 The effect of such provisions
is to include other officers by implication, since the rule applied
by 'courts that to mention some of a class excludes all others
operates here in a negative sense."' In other states some officers-usually firemen and peace officers-are specifically included within the definition of the term "employee," with the
result that they are protected even though officers in general are
excluded by the statute.4 2 When the legislature has clearly de38

In Mono County v. Industrial Accident Commission, (1917) 175 Cal.
752, 167 Pac. 377, elected officers were held to be excluded. In the same
year the legislature amended the law to include such officers. Cal. Laws
1917, ch. 586.
In 1920 the supreme court of Connecticut held that policemen were not
included under the compensation law. McDonald v. City of New Haven,
(1920) 94 Conn. 403, 109 Atl. 176. In 1921 the legislature specifically included policemen. Connecticut, Laws 1921, ch. 306.
"9City v. Industrial Accident Commission, (1919) 291 I1. 33. 125 N. F_
705; Hall v. City of Shreveport, (1925) 157 La. 589, 102 So. 680.
40 The Colorado law defines "employee" as any persor). "under any appointment or contract of hire, express or implied," but specifically excludes
elected officials. Colorado, Code 1921, sec. 4383. See also Nebraska, Compiled Statutes, sec. 3038; West Virginia, Laws 1915; Michigan, Public Acts
1912, Act No. 10, as amended.
41The Minnesota law excluded "any official . ..who shall have been
elected or appointed for a regular term of office." A policeman appointed
for an indefinite term was held to be included under the application of the
law. The court held that there was no need of deciding whether or not a
policeman was an "officer" within the general meaning of the term, because
he was not included within the definition of officers excluded by the statute.
State ex rel. Duluth v. District Court, (1916) 134 Minn. 26, 158 N. W.
790.
'42 See Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sec. 4326; Oregon General Laws
(Olson) 1920, sec. 6624, as amended by ch. 311, Laws of 1921, ch. 133, Laws
of 1925, and ch. 312, Laws of 1927; South Dakota, Revised Code of 1919,
sec. 9490, as amended by ch. 253, Laws of 1929. Wisconsin, Statutes 1927,
sec. 102.07.
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fined a term used in a statute, its intention is known and the courts
need not apply the general meaning of the term.4"
DEPUTIZED CITIZENS

Another class of persons who are in a position much the same
as that of officers-so far as employment status is concernedare deputized citizens temporarily assisting sheriffs or other peacc
officers. As is the case with officers, there is question whether
such persons are "employees" and-if the term "employee" is
defined-whether they have any contract of hire or apprenticeship with the governmental agency which the deputizing officer
represents.
In 1920 the attorney general of Minnesota rendered an opinion
in which he held that a deputized citizen was not protected by
the compensation law. The basis of his opinion was that "the
statute implies a contract of hire, and in a general way, at least,
the relation of master and servant." No such relationship existed
between the political entity and a deputized citizen, for the duty
performed by the latter was merely "one of the incidental duties
of citizenship. ' 44 A similar distinction between the "duties of
citizenship" and employment has been applied by a California
court of appeals.

4 5

But where the peace officers have themselves been included
within the application of the compensation laws, citizens deputized
to assist such officers have generally been held to be protected. A
citizen temporarily deputized by a sheriff is compelled to perform duties of a deputy sheriff, and has therefore assume(] the
4
risks and the protection incident to that office. "
43

State ex rel. Duluth v. District Court, (1916) 134 Minn. 26, 158
N. W. 790.
But in Virginia a deputy sheriff was excluded from the application of
the compensation law even though he was within the definition of the statute, because the constitution provided that "counties shall not be made
responsible for the acts of the sheriffs." Board of Supervisors of Rockingham County v. Lucas, (1925) 142 Va. 84, 128 S. E. 574.
"4Department of Labor and Industries, State of Minnesota, Bulletin
No. 17, Court Decisions, Attorney General's Opinions, Department of Labor
Advice Relative to the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1920, p. 54.
45City of Los Angeles v. State Industrial Accident Commission, (1917)
35 Cal. App. 31, 169 Pac. 260. In this case a judge of elections was held
not to be an employee, because he was performing a public duty "which
may 46be imposed upon any citizen."
Monterey County v. Rader, (1926) 191 Cal. 221, 248 Pac. 912.
A deputized citizen killed while making an arrest, was "doing police
duties" and was therefore covered by a workmen's compensation which
defined "employee" as including policemen. Village of West Salem v.
Industrial Commission, (1916) 162 Wis. 152, 155 N. W. 929.
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OTHER QUESTIONS OF EMPLOYMENT STATUS

In addition to public officers there are other persons who may
frequently perform services for a political entity, but who are
not employees within the meaning of the law. The most common
of these is the independent contractor or his employee. When a
person has entered into a contract with the state or with one of
its subdivisions and hires other persons to help him carry out his
obligations under the contract, it is clear that neither he nor the
persons working for him are employees of the political entity.
But where the agreement involves such a small amount that no
written contract is entered into and where the service requires the
work of only one or two persons, it is frequently difficult to determine whether the relationship is one of employment or of independent contract.
In determining whether a particular person is an employee of
the political entity or an independent contractor, the courts and
commissions apply three or four important rules. First, an employee must perform the required services personally, while a
contractor may generally hire others to perform them if he
wishes.47 Second, an employee is "subject to the directions, supervision and control of the employer as to the means and time
of performing such service," while a contractor "is obligated
merely as to the result of the work.48 Furthermore, a contractor
more frequently has his own equipment with which to perform
the work called for. 9 The method of paying for services, although not conclusive in itself, may sometimes be suggestive of
the nature of the relationship. 0
But the above mentioned rules do not hold in all cases. If the
employer knows that an employee has another person substitute
47Peterson v. Town of Prairieville, Minnesota Industrial Commission,
(1925) 3 Minnesota Workmen's Compensation Decisions, 155; Potter v.
Scotts Bluff County, (1924) 112 Neb. 318, 199 N. W. 507; Hays v. Board
of Trustees
of Clinton School City, T1927) 86 Ind. 460, 158 N. E. 234.
8

4 Preston v. Adams County, Ninth Biennial Report of the Workmen's
Compensation Service of Iowa, 1930 p. 106, Morganelli's Estate v. City
of Derby,
(1927) 105 Conn. 545, 135 At. 911.
459 Potter v. Scotts Bluff County, (1924) 112 Neb. 318, 199 N. W. 507.
Potter v. Scotts Bluff County, (1924) 112 Neb. 318, 199 N. W. 507.
It is probable that the states frequently follow the federal employees'
compensation commission in holding that advertising and bidding is an
indication of contractual relationship, although that point has not been emphasized in compensation cases.
If other conditions make the relationship clear, the method of paying
for services has no effect. Rouse v. Town of Bird Island, (1926) 169 Minn.
367, 211 N. W. 327.
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for him and approves of the practice, the substitute, as well as the
person with whom a contract of employment has been made, is
protected by the compensation law while he is actually performing his duties. 1 This rule does not apply, however, if the substitute is obtained without the knowledge and consent of those
authorized to engage employees, or if the employee and his helper
are both working at the same time. 2 The extent of the power of
direction over workers on the part of the political entity is a
question of fact rather than of law, and it is frequently difficult
to determine; but if determined, it is a more definite guide than
either the personal requirements of the work or the ownership
of the equipment.5 3
In many cases the question is not whether a person is an employee or an independent contractor, but rather one of whether
there is any contractural relationship at all between the employing public and the person claiming compensation. As the writer
has pointed out above, one reason which the courts have given for
excluding officers and deputized citizens from the operation of
compensation laws is that they have no contract of employment
with the political entity. It has also been pointed out that no
person can become an employee of another without the other's
consent. This leads us to the question of who is authorized to
give consent when the employer is a political entity. It is evident
that a person who does not have the power to appoint employees
or officers cannot bind the public to pay compensation to one illegally appointed. But if an appointment is made by one not having the authority and the wage bills are later approved by the
person or body of persons having authority to appoint or hire
employees, that approval constitutes valid appointment so far as
the right to disability compensation is concerned. 4
5SWhere one of two brothers was appointed foreman of a gravel pit by
the county engineer, with the understanding that the brother of the appointee might substitute as such foretnan, the substitute was an employee
entitled to workmen's compensation. Benson v. Marshall County, (1925)
163 Minn. 309. 204 N. W. 40.
In another case a man had bid for work of collecting garbage at $100
per month, and his father did the work. Warrants were made out to the
father, and the court held him to be an employee of the village-overruling
the industrial commission's decision. Schullo v. Village of Nashwauk,
(1926)
52 116 Minn. 186, 207 N. W. 621.
"No one can become an emnloye of another without the consent of the
other." Arterbum v. Redwood County, (1923) 154 Minn. 338. 191 N. W.
924. See also Board of Commissioners v. Merrit, (1924) 81 Ind. App. 488,
143 N.
W. 711.
53
54 Rouse v. Town of Bird Island, (1926) 169 Minn. 367, 211 N. W. 327.
Where one member of a town board told a road patrolman to get a
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HAZARDOUS EMPLOYMENTS

In several states the application of the compensation lawsor of their compulsory provisions-is limited to occupations which
are designated as "hazardous" or "extra-hazardous." The occupations so designated are generally enumerated, or the nature of
the work defined. The public employments most commonly enumerated are construction work of all kinds, operation of public
utilities, and the work of peace officers and firemen."
Due to the fact that hazardous employments are enumerated.
most of the questions which arise thereunder relate to the meaning of particular enumerations, which are often peculiar to one
state. Nevertheless a few generalizations may be drawn from the
decisions. In the first place, the courts, in determining whether
or not a particular employee is covered by the law, look at the
nature of the occupation as a whole rather than at the task being
performed at the time of the accident. Thus, a person who is
ordinarily engaged in a non-hazardous employment but who is
temporarily performing some hazardous task is generally not
protected by the compensation law.5 6 On the other hand, a perhelper and cut brush along the road, and where the town board later approved the helper's wage bill, that helper was an "employee" of the town.
Reed v. Township of Monticello, (1925) 164 Minn. 358, 205 N. W. 258.
"A workman . . . does not run the risk of losing the benefits of the
compensation act if he is mistaken as to the law relative to the powers of
the town board acting in good faith in a matter entrusted to its care."
Gabler V. Bertha Township, (1927) 169 Minn. 413, 211 N. W. 477.
But in Wisconsin the state law (Statutes of Wisc., sec. 40.24) provides that "no act authorized to be done by the [school] board shall be
valid unless voted at its meeting." As a result a person hired by the clerk
of a school district with the informal approval of the board was not. an
employee, notwithstanding the fact that he had performed his work and
had received wages with the approval of the board for two winters. School
Dist. No. 4 v. Industrial Commission, (1927) 194 Wis. 342, 216 N. W. 844.
55
Montana, Political Code 1921, secs. 2647-2852, as amended by ch. 117,
Laws of 1925, secs. 2862-2863 as amended by ch. 121, Laws of 1925; New
York, Consolidated Laws, ch. 67, sec. 3; Oklahoma, Compiled Statutes
1921, ch. 56, secs. 7283-7284, as amended by ch. 61, Laws of 1923; Oregon,
General Laws (Olson) 1920, sec. 6624 as amended by ch. 311, Laws of
1921, ch. 133, Laws of 1925, and ch. 312, Laws of 1917; Washington, Compiled Statutes, (Remington) sec. 7694 as amended by ch. 310, Laws of 1927,
and sec. 7694a as added by ch. 128, Laws of 1923; Wyoming, Compiled
Statutes 1920, sec. 4318, as amended by ch. 138, Laws of 1921 and ch. 60,
Laws of 1923.
In North Dakota a "hazardous employment" is defined as any employment in which one or more persons are regularly employed. Ch. 162,
Acts of 1919, as amended by ch. 142, Acts of 1921, and ch. 222, Acts of
1925. The New York law applies to "any employment by the state." Consolidated Code, ch. 67, sec. 3, group 16.
56
In Illinois road building was not listed as hazardous in 1917, but
occupations in which high explosives were handled were so listed. The

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

son employed in a hazardous occupation is protected while performing incidental tasks not enumerated in the law."' In the
second place, the meaning of a particular term is frequently determined by its association with other terms. For example, the
word "engineering work," when listed in the same part of a section as "factories" and "gas works," was construed not to apply
to the work of a highway engineer, but instead to shops where
engineering work is done."" Finally, general terms, such as "other
hazardous occupations" are construed to be limited by the specific
terms, with the result that the other occupations must be of the
same general type as those listed.59 This construction would
probably limit the power of the Industrial Commissions to declare
new occupations to be extra-hazardous when such power is granted
by statute. 60
When the statute applies only to "workmen," "laborers," or
"mechanics," 6' the effect is much the same as though it were
limited to hazardous occupations, since the enumerations in the
latter include practically all persons in the laboring classes. Such
provisions, like those relating to hazardous employments, are intended to apply to classes of employees rather than to the nature
of the work being performed at the time of the injury. 2 But the
court held that the occasional use of dynamite in road building did not make
that occupation one of the hazardous ones within the meaning of the statute.
McLaughlin v. Industrial Board, (1917) 281 Ill.
100, 117 N. E. 819. See
also Charity Hospital v. Bd. of School Directors, (La. 1932) 140 So. 60.
r7Lanigan v. Town of Saugerties, (1917) 180 App. Div. 227. 167 N. Y.
S.654; Sexton v. Public Service Commission of New York City, (1917)
180 App.
Div. 111, 167 N. Y. S. 493.
5
"Board of Commissioners v. Grimes, (1919) 75 OkI. 219, 182 Pac. 897.
But in Illinois the term "workshop" was held to include a manual training workshop in a school. Board of Education v. Industrial Commission,
(1922)9 301 Ill. 611, 134 N. E. 70.
' Board of Education v. Industrial Commission, (1922) 301 Ill.
611,
134 N. E. 70. The Oklahoma court extended the application of the law on
the ground that the legislature showed by the enumeration that it intended
to cover work of a "manual and mechanical nature." Bd. of Commissioners v. Jackson, (1921) 83 Okl. 48, 201 Pac. 998.
GOIn Moore v. Industrial Accident Fund, (1927) 80 Mont. 136, 259 Pac.
825, the court implied such a construction by pointing out that "if" the Industrial Accident Board had power to declare the occupation of road supervisor hazardous, that body and not the court should do so.
6IThe Massachusetts law applies only to those public employments in
which "laborers, workmen, and mechanics"-including foremen and inspectors-are engaged. Ch. 636, Acts of 1914; ch. 125, Acts of 1918. But by
separate acts policemen, firemen, and members of the National Guard are
entitled to the benefits of the compensation law. Chs. 157 and 291, Acts of
1927.6 2
A teacher in an industrial school, injured while demonstrating automobile mechanics, was not a "mechanic" in the sense the term was used in
the compensation law of Massachusetts. The law, said the court, intend-
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classification of a position in the local civil service rules does not
'
determine whether or not the holder of the position is a "laborer."6
SPECIAL EXEMPTIONS

A few other provisions which are frequently found in workmen's compensation laws have important bearings upon the application of the laws to persons in the public service. Among
such provisions are those excluding farm labor, those exempting
employers who hire less than a stated number of workers, and
those excluding employments which are "casual and not in the
employer's trade or business."
The effect of the exclusion of farm labor would seem to depend upon whether such exclusion were so stated as to modify
the entire definition of "employee" or "employment" or whether
it might apply only to private employments. If,as in many cases,
one paragraph defines "employee" as related to the state and its
subdivisions, and another paragraph defines "employee" as related to private business, the exclusion of farm laborers in the
latter definition would not result in the exclusion of persons engaged in agricultural labor on state owned or county owned
farms." On the other hand, if a common definition is given for
both public and private employees, and persons employed as farm
laborers are excluded, the public status of his employer would not
entitle a worker to compensation under the law. 5
The same rule would apply to provisions exempting employers
who employ less than a stated number of workers. In most states
the exemptions are so stated that they clearly apply to private
ed "to distinguish certain well known classes of servants from other classes."

Lesueur v. City of Lowell, (1917) 227 Mass. 44, 116 N. E. 483.
A policeman is not a "workman employed for wages." Harris v.Mayor,
etc., 63
of Baltimore, (1926) 151 Md. 11, 133 At. 888.
A school janitor, although classified in the "official service" instead
of the "labor service," was a "laborer." "The question of whether a janitor
is or is not within that class (covered by the workmen's compensation law)
must be the same throughout the commonwealth." White v. City of Boston, (1917) 226 Mass. 517, 116 N. E. 481. This decision did not follow that
of Devney v. City of Boston, (1916) 223 Mass. 270, 111 N. E. 788. in which
the court held that an engine horseman was an official, because his position
was classified in "the official service" and because the legislature was presumed to have known the civil service classifications at the time the act was
extended to public employees. The two cases may be distinguished, however, 4by the fact that firemen are frequently classed as officers.
665See Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., Sec. 4326.
Whether a laborer is a farm employee or not depends upon the character of the work, not upon the general business of the employer. Dowery
v. State, (1925) 84 Ind. App. 37, 149 N. E. 922.
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employers only. But in Kansas, where the statute enumerated
"county and municipal work" as hazardous, but did not specify
counties or municipalities in the definition of "employers," the
law was held not to apply to a city which engaged fewer than
fifteen persons in hazardous employments.66
The provisions excluding from the benefits of the compensation law persons whose work is "casual and not in the course of
trade, business, profession, or occupation of the employer" seldom if ever operate to exclude persons employed by political
entities. The work may at times be casual, but it seems that it
would always be a part of the "business" of the employer. Otherwise it would be difficult to justify as public the purpose for
which wages were paid to the worker. 7 But if the employment
need only to be casual to be excluded, certain public employments
may be affected.6"
DUAL SUPERIORS

In consequence of the fact that officers and employees frequently serve in dual capacities as agents of two governmental
jurisdictions, questions occasionally arise as to which superior is
liable for the payment of disability compensation. Ordinarily
county officers, although carrying out state laws, are regarded as
county employees when included under the compensation law."
Similarly, national guardsmen are entitled to compensation from
the state, notwithstanding the fact that the National Defense Act
established a system of close supervision by the national govern66
Ubey v. City of Winfield, (1916) 97 Kan. 279, 155 Pac. 43. The
Kansas law now exempts employers engaging fewer than eleven persons
in hazardous work.
67
A person engaged to load gravel for street repairing may have been
a casual worker, but he was engaged in the course of his employer's business. State v. District Court, (1915) 131 Minn. 352, 155 N. W. 103. See
also Reed v. Township of Monticello, (1928) 164 Minn. 358, 205 N. W. 258.
A special policeman assigned to a theatre was "in the business of the
police force." Lake v. City of Bridgeport, (1925) 102 Conn. 337, 128 Atl.
782. But see Charity Hospital v. Bd. of School Directors, (La. 1932) 140
So. 60.
6
"Idaho, Compiled Statutes 1919, sec. 6216; Nevada, Laws 1913, ch.
111, sec. 7Y (a).
6
9A person deputized by a county sheriff was a county "employee," although he was deputized for the purpose of helping the state warden recapture an escaped prisoner. Curran v. Delta County, (1925) 230 Mich. 694,,
203 N. W. 470.
But the Iowa statute provides that disabled peace officers shall be paid
compensation from the general funds of the st-ite. Iowa, Code 1927, ;ec.
1922.
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ment. ° But where a state officer or bodv has direct control over
a county officer with power to approve or disapprove the latter's
appointment and power to remove him, the county officer will
probably be classed as a state employee.- 1 In all such cases, however, the source from which the salary or wages are paid is an im2
portant factor in determining liability.
COMPULSORY AND ELECTIVE AcTs

In most states the workmen's compensation laws are compulsory for those public employments which are included- within the
definition of "employer" and "employee. '" '
In those states where
the laws are optional, however, the court decisions alone will not
indicate the extent of the protection afforded to public servants.
It is therefore necessary to look into the actual acceptance of the
provisions of the law, as well as into the provisions for alternative
liability, in cases of non-acceptance.
In five or six states the compensation laws are in form optional,
but in effect compulsory. Election to come within the application
of the law is presumed in absence of notice to the contrary. If an
employer elects to reject the act, or, in some states, if he fails to
insure his compensation liability, he may be sued for damages, and
he loses the common law defenses of contributory negliZence,
negligence of a fellow servant, and the assumption of risks by the
employee.7 4 There is no doubt but that a municipal corporation
which rejected the provisions of a compensation act would lose
these defenses in a case arising out of the exercise of its proprietary functions. But if an employee or officer were injured in the
exercise of a governmental duty, the political entity, when sued at
70
The National Guard is only a potential part of the United States
Army. State v. Johnson et al., (1925) 186 Wis. 1. 202 N. W. 191.
,lFoyle v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Penn. Workmen's Compensation Board, Feb. 13, 1930, (1930) 17 Labor and Industry 17-23.
A similar view was taken by the U. S. Employees' Compensation Commission where a county agricultural agent was paid by three jurisdictions
but was subject to direction and removal by the U. S. Secretary of Agriculture. United States Employees' Compensation Commission. Second Annual 72Report, p. 63.
1n the case of Foyle v. Commonwealth. Penn. Workmen's Compensation Board, Feb. 13, 1930. 17 Labor and Industry 17-23. the county
superintendent and his assistant were paid from assessments anportioned
among the districts with no district snerintcndent. not by the county
as such.
See also Peck's Case, (1924) 250 Mass. 261, 145 N. F. 532.
7
3See
Tables I and II. pp. 185-86.
4
7 Sce Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat.. secs. 4262-4263: Connecticut. Revised
Laws 1918, title 53, sec. 5339; Nebraska. Compiled Statutes. ch. 28. sec.
3035.
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common law or under an employer's liability act, would interpose
the defense of non-liability in governmental functions. The question therefore arises as to whether or not a political entity which
has rejected the provisions of the workmen's compensation act
loses its immunity from liability in governmental functions when
an employee is injured. Few cases have been decided on that
point, probably because of the general acceptance of the acts; but
the view taken by courts in three states indicates that the defense
would be considered as lost. The laws are remedial and should
be liberally construed, and if the legislature included governmental
functions under the compensation system, it must have intended
to protect such employments the same as other employments. 5
Thus it may be observed that, while the alternative liability provisions are in the nature of employers' liability laws, the courts
have extended their application further than they would if the
liability provisions were found alone.
But this construction of the compensation law would hardly
apply to the state itself. Here the courts would no doubt apply
the rule that any act waiving the state's immunity from liability
and from suit should be strictly construed. 6 One decision went
so far as to say that the provision entitling state employees to
compensation had no effect because the state had failed to make
a special appropriation for the payment of compensation claims."
75The intention of the legislature was to exclude all common law defenses, although the three most common ones were enumerated. The court
added that it need not account for the reason why the legislature chose
one method of exclusion rather than another. Fahler v. City of Minot,
(1923) 49 N. D. 960, 194 N. W. 695.
The statute should be liberally construed to include governmental functions. Esque v. City of Huntington, (1927) 104 W. Va. 110, 139 S. E. 469.
The West Virginia decision did not draw any conclusions from, or refer to,
the fact that the law of that state expressly provides that the state shall
retain its common law defenses even though it does not elect to come unler
the compensation act. Ch. 131, Laws of 1919.
In Oklahoma the court decided that a county which failed to take out
compensation insurance was not liable in tort for injuries to an employee.
although a private employer failing to insure would have been so liable.
The decision pointed out, however, that the employee still had the right to
sue for workmen's compensation. Whiteneck v. Board of Commissioners.
(1923) 89 Okl. 52. 213 Pac. 865.
-'Miller v. Pillsbury. (1912) 164 Cal. 199. 128 Pac. 327: Babcock v.
State, (1919) 190 App. Div. 147, 180 N. Y. S. 3.
"7Smith v. State Highway Commission, (1921) 131 Va. 571, 109 S. F.
312. The Virginia Code 1919. sec. 2582, provided that no judgment or
decree, "unless otherwise provided for," shall be paid without special appropriation. This, the court held, prohibited the industrial commission from
granting any award against the state until the legislature had appropriated
money to pay the award.
But injured state employees in Virginia are receiving compensation not-
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In most states the compensation law is in itself an acceptance of
its provisions by the state, or else it clearly indicates that the
state loses no defenses for failure to accept.78 For that reason
there are apparently no cases bearing directly on the question of
the state's own alternative liability.
An interesting, as well as unusual, case involving the question of a state's alternative liability was decided recently by the
supreme court of North Dakota. The legislature of South Dakota,
in compliance with a declaration in the constitution to the effect
that the mining, distribution, and sale of coal was "a public necessity in which the state may engage," purchased coal mines in
North Dakota. A coal mining commission was created with
power to hire labor and operate the mines. The North Dakota
compensation law provided that any employer who failed to insure his employees in the state fund would lose his common law
defenses in a suit for damages. A citizen of South Dakota, employed in the said mines, was injured, and sued the state of South
Dakota in the courts of North Dakota. He contended that since
the state was engaged in a private function outside of its own
jurisdiction, it had lost its sovereign rights and was liable to suit
the same as a private employer. The court denied the contention, however, and held that it would not decide what jurisdiction
it had in the case, because, as a matter of comity, it should not
take jurisdiction. It was also pointed out that the injured employee
was entitled to the benefits of the South Dakota compensation
79

law.
withstanding the fact that no special appropriations are made. In reply
to an inquiry from the writer, a member of the industrial commission gave
the following explanation:
"The general assembly of Virginia does not make regular appropriations for the purpose of meeting awards under the provisions of the compensation act, and I am confident that no provision has been made by the legislature to cover cases parallel with the Smith Case. which you cited.
"The greater portion of the state departments carry a policy (f insurance, on account of which the carriers, of course, actually assume all liability. There are a few of the state departments, however, which selfinsure, that is, carry their own insurance, these departments paying compensntion direct to the injured emolovees. I do not know the source from
which these funds are made available, but I am confident that there has
been no special legislation covering the same." Letter from the Secretary
of the Industrial Commission of Virginia, January 5, 1931.
7
8See note 67.
79Paulus v. State of South Dakota, (1924) 52 N. Dak. 84, 201 N. W.
867.
"The initial question here is not as to whether the courts of North
Dakota might have or might assume jurisdiction of the plaintiff's case, but
whether, as a matter of comity they should do so."
The court did not stop with this, but went on to deny the plaintiff's
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In most of the states which have semi-compulsory compensation laws the employees may elect not to be subject to the laws;
but if they do, the employers retain their common law defenses. °
Such election by public employees seldom or never occurs.
In about half a dozen states the compensation laws are purely
elective for all municipalities and other local governments. The
provisions of the acts do not apply unless the local governing
bodies elect to accept them and file notice of such acceptance with
the state department which administers the law. 81 Employees
are generally presumed to have elected to accept the acts in the
absence of notice to the contrary. There is no added liability
imposed upon public employers if they do not accept the compensation laws.
In these states the protection afforded to public employees and
officers depends almost entirely upon the extent to which the
local governments have elected to accept the acts. The actual acceptance varies greatly from state to state, ranging from two
cities in Rhode Island and fourteen in Kentucky, to all cities in
Massachusetts. But on the whole one can probably say with
safety that not more than one fourth of the employees and officers of local governments in the states with purely elective
82
systems are protected by the workmen's compensation laws.
contention that South Dakota was engaged in a private function. At least
it was not for the courts of North Dakota to hold that South Dakota has
engaged in a private function. "Where the courts of South Dakota have
not so held, but, on the contrary the people of that state, by constitutional
provision and legislative enactment, have declared otherwise, we should
hesitate to challenge the propriety of that declaration." As to the matter of
extra-territorial jurisdiction, the court answered that the state of North
Dakota did not bring this case, and therefore "North Dakota makes no
complaint."
'*Connecticut, Revised Laws 1918, title 53, secs. 5340; Mason's 1927
Minnesota Stat., sec. 4264; Nebraska, Compiled Statutes, ch. 28, sec. 3035;
New Mexico, Laws 1929, ch. 113; Kentucky, Laws 1916, ch. 33.
West
Virginia has no provision for rejection by the employee.
81
Alabama Code 1923, sec. 7543; Maine, Laws 1929, ch. 300; Vermont,
General
82 Laws 1917, sec. 5769.
In November, 1930, the writer sent letters to the departments of labor
in states having elective compensation systems, inquiring about the extent
of acceptance of the laws by cities. The replies were as follows:
All cities in Massachusetts have accepted the law.
In Kansas 58 cities had accepted.
In Missouri 21 cities had accepted.
In Kentucky 14 cities and towns had accepted.
In Rhode Island two cities and no towns had accepted.
In New Hampshire "many of the cities and towns" had accepted.
In Vermont "comparatively few"-possibly 30 of the 288 cities and
towns in the state-had accepted.
No reply was received from Delaware, but its law applies at most to

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS

The elective system also applies to the non-hazardous employments in states whose compensation laws are compulsory for
hazardous employments. The extent of acceptance is difficult
to determine because no state has any compiled records of such
acceptances. New York is probably the only state in which there
has been any substantial acceptance, and in that state the acceptance has arisen out of the practice, and perhaps a legal requirement, of insuring all employees. Self-insuring cities do not as a
rule bring non-hazardous employments within the scope of the
system. 83
CONCLUSION

From the above discussion it should be apparent that the
extent of the protection afforded to public servants varies greatly
from state to state. There are forty-four state compensation laws,
hardly any two of which are alike even in their definitions of
"employer" and employee." Furthermore, although a number
of rules of construction have been established, the courts are not
in agreement on their interpretation of the statutory provisions.
Finally, the extent of the application of the laws depends, in
several states, upon the acceptance by local governments. Where
such acceptance is formal and where records of acceptance are
compiled by state departments, one may determine the approximate
scope of the protection. But in some states no records are kept
and no central department is established with which acceptances
are filed."4 Besides there may be acceptances without formal
notice in other states, either through payment of compensation
without contest to persons legally not entitled thereto, or through
insuring without legal liability on the part of the political entity. In
a general way, however, the statutory provisions with judicial
interpretations thereof and the records of formal acceptances
present a fair picture of the extensiveness of protection afforded
to public servants against disability in the course of their duties.
There is no doubt that, in the absence of other extensive
only a few designated jurisdictions.
In Tennessee "about 5 per cent of the cities and counties" had accepted.
Very
few of the larger cities have elected to accept optional laws.
S3Letter from the Director of the Bureau of Workmen's Compensation
of New York, November 14, 1930.
The director of the Washington Department of Labor and Industries
replied that not more than two or three cities in that state have come under
the elective adoption clause of the compensation act. Letter of November
19. 1930.
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relief provisions for public servants, there is need for broadening
the scope of the workmen's compensation laws in many states.
For non-hazardous employments the cost of compensation is
small, while in the hazardous employments the social evils resulting from lack of protection make the greater cost worth
while. Because of the uncertainty of acceptance by local governments, and because of the confusion which may result from
alternative liability provisions, the compensation laws should be
made automatic and compulsory for the state and all of its governmental subdivisions. Finally, in view of the attitude taken
by many courts in construing the compensation laws, the statutes
should specify clearly which public servants are to be covered by
the law. Legislators should keep in mind the statement of one
court that if the legislature intended to include certain public
employments, "it is remarkable that no apt and clear language
indicating such intention was used."8'
The following tables indicate in a general way the scope of the
workmen's compensation laws of the various states and territories
as applied to public employees and officers. States have been
classified according to statutory provisions as construed, in so far
as can be determined, by the courts."'
84
1n Alabama the employer who elects to accept the law files notice of
such acceptance with the probate judge of his county. Alabama Code 1923,

sec. 85
7543.

Roberts v. City of Ottawa, (1917) 101
"eA number of statutory details relating
of particular officers or employees have been
standings which might result with regard to

Kan. 228, 165 Pac. 869.
to the inclusion or exclusion
omitted, because of misunderother states.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS

TABLE I
APPLICATION OF COMPENSATION LAWS TO
STATE GOVERNMENTS

Covers all
officers
and
employees

Automatic
Coverage

California
Idaho
Nevada
Utah

Excludes
elected
officers
and others
as noted

Covers all
employees;
excludes
officers

Connecticut
Arizona'
Illinois
Colorado
Indiana
Michigan
Louisiana
Minnesota22
Nebraska s Maine
New Jersey 4 New York
No. Carolina Ohio
No. Dakota2 Pennsylvania
Rhode
So. Dakota
Island
Virginia 4
Wisconsin 5
Hawaii'

Alabama9 9
Georgia
Iowa' 0, 112
Maryland
Massachusetts13
Montana
New Mexico
Oklahoma
Oregon']
Tennessee 9
Vermont'
Washington"

Philippine

Wyoming

Administrative
Departments

Delaware
West

Virginia

7

No provision for
state
employees

Kansas
MissouriTexas
5
Arkansas'
Florida' 5
Mississippi"s
So. Carolina's
Alaska

Porto Rico' 0

Islandse
Optional
with

Covers
workers in
certain
"hazardous"
employments

Kentucky
New

Hampshire

"Excludes officers with salaries above a stated amount.
2Excludes officers appointed for regular terms.
sExcludes persons with salaries over $1200 a year: hence few officers Included.
,Excludes officers appointed by the governor or legislature.
&Excludes officers except those subject to the control of any superior officer
or officers.
OExcludes all persons with salaries above a stated amount.
'EMection by the governor.
sThe governor and council "may" pay compensation.
'Laborers in highway department only.
10]excludes persons engaged in purely clerical work.
"Includes peace officers.
"Specifically includes state police.
"Applies to "laborers, workmen, and mechanics."
lThe state may elect "by law." There has apparently been no such election.
"Has no workmen's compensation law.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

TABLE II
APPLICATION OF COMPENSATION LAWS TO LOCAL GOVERNMENTS.
[

Covers
officers
and
employees

ExcudesCovers

Excludes
elected,
and/or some
appointed
officers
Arizona 2 3

Compul- California
Colorado
Idaho'
sory
Michigan
Nevada
New Jersey2 4
Utah
No. Carolina
No. Dakota4

So. Dakota , 5

Covers
employees;
excludes
officers

Georgia 10
Illinois
Indiana
Maine
(except
towns)
Ohio"

Compul-

4
Nebraska , 7

Carolina

Washing5,
IT
Wyoming 2, 18
18

KansasI9

Connecticut 7 , 12

New

3

Mexico . 7

sory

Optional Missouri2

Oregon , 17

Porto
Ricot.

Philippine
2
Islands

Minnesota 4, 5,

Texas
Alaska 20
Arkansas
Floridal'
Mississippi20
So.
20

Iowa5, 10
Louisiana 1
Maryland "
Montana 17
New York
Oklahoma
5

2
Virginia 4 . otonPennsylvania1
Wisconsinrl
Hawaii 2

Semi-

No provision for
public
employ.
ment

workers in
certain
"hazardous"
employments

West
s
Virginia

Delaware 9

Massachusetts
2
Vermont , 13

Alabama
8
Kentucky

Maine
(towns)

New
Hampshire
Rhode 2
Island , is
Tennessee

14

'Excludes judges and clerks of elections, and jurors.
2Excludes persons whose salaries exceed a stated amount. (Missouri, $3600 a
year; Arizona officers $2400; New Jersey, $1200; Hawaii, $1800; Philippines. 800
pesos: Rhode Island, $3000; Vermont, $2000.)
'Excludes members of volunteer fire departments.
4Excludes officers appointed for regular terms.
5Peace officers specifically included even though elected.
"Excludes all officers except those "subject to the direction and control of a
superior officer or officers" of the county, city, etc.
'Election to come within the application of the act presumed in absence of
notice to the contrary. An employer who rejects the act loses the three important
common law defenses of contributory negligence, negligence of fellow servant. and
assumption of risks.
'Common law defenses (7 above) lost by non-electing employer; but since election is not presumed, the act is regarded here as optional.
9Act applies only to the cities of Dover and Wilmington and to the counties of
Kent and Newcastle. Election exercised by the mayor of Wilmington and by the
governing bodies of the other jurisdictions named above.
"Does not include county employees.
"Specifically excludes policemen and firemen eligible to benefits of any local pen.
sion funds.
"2Municipalities authorized to insure or pay disability compensation to volunteer firemen.
"3Paid members of fire and police departments expressly included.
4Act does not mention local public employments, but several municipalities pay
compensation under it.
"3Cities and towns, in electing, may specify which employees shall be covered.
"6Purely clerical employees excluded. Other employments covered.
"Acceptance of act optional for non-hazardous employments.
"Firemen specifically included, whether paid or unpaid.
lHazardous employments for "gain or profit." Option as to other employments.
"Has no workmen's compensation law.

